

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
Routing Slip

*MEMO*  
*CHRONO*


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SUSPENSE 8 APRIL  
Date

Remarks:

*D/* Executive Secretary  
*3/25/80*  
Date

24 March 1983



MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Intel for Military Commands


25X1 1. [ ] asked to see me today to report on his discussions with General Kingston about the need of the Rapid Deployment Force for a senior intelligence official assigned to the command. He spent quite a lot of time with General Kingston and his staff. As he related their requirements to me, I have formed the opinion that they don't need a full-time person but they do need more attention, more sharply focused on defining their intelligence requirements and to find when and how our capabilities and intelligence flow can be managed to meet their needs. It also occurred to me that the other commands have precisely the same requirements as we do given the full benefits of the resources that have been entrusted to us. We talked about doing this for the European command. I will get a similar set of perceptions in my visit to Korea and I think what Fred has to say about the RDF is useful.

2. I question whether the liaison activities with the military are now being coordinated well enough--there is delay of DoD in doing the intelligence coordination, IAD through [ ] and Enders doing coordination on operational needs, DDI's intelligence liaison staff focusing on using our intelligence flow to meet the needs of military commands, Dave McManis working on warning which is largely a military matter, and then there is the RDF and Korean needs. [ ]

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[ ] I'd like to see some mechanism for a more active role in seeking to improve selection and definition of what we can do for military commands and sharpen the articulation and definition on the part of military staffs of what their intel requirements are, as well as see that coordination and operational requirements are being met and seeing that the process of selecting and recruiting potential operations officers and other talent in the military is being pursued vigorously.

25X1 3. Let me suggest that one or both of you get [ ] views on the basis of his explorations with the RDF and the people who serve them here, and see if we can't review and put it all together after I have had a look at Korea.

  
William J. Casey


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